This is an implementation of the Schnorr/taproot consensus rules proposed by BIPs , , and See the list of commits below. No signing or wallet support of any kind is included, as testing is done entirely through the Python test framework. This is a successor to # (see discussion following this comment), and will have further changes squashed/rebased. Bip Bitcoin github is a decentralized digital nowness without a central bank or single administrator that fundament differ sent from somebody to user on the peer-to-peer bitcoin network without the involve for intermediaries. written record square measure verified away meshing nodes through cryptography and recorded in a public distributed. rows · Oct 21, · Contribute to bitcoin/bips development by creating an account on GitHub. Bitcoin Improvement Proposals. Contribute to bitcoin/bips development by creating an account on GitHub. Having a BIP here does not make it a formally accepted standard until its .
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In 3c "tests: add BIP Schnorr signature support to test framework". I commented out these 2 lines and no tests failed. I think the only thing that's wrong here is the comment: with this change, it's not longer "correcting" the oddness; it's just negating if an odd Y coordinate is desired. The code is necessary though, but possibly untested. It's what constructs a point from a compressed public key. This comment is also being addressed in This is being addressed in Note to other reviewers: even though this is a move from existing code, I was still curious about whether this assert is safe.
There are three call-sites for CheckInputScripts ; here they are with the various ways they ensure the input coins aren't already spent and so this assert won't blow up :. Note to reviewers: serializes as [amount i. ACK 0e2a5e4 - code review, just nits. Without that's annoying to do, as it means constructing both a valtype and a CScript with the same data. You're right that future version leafs may not want a script at all, but until then, little reason to add this complication.
This regression introduced in ba0 is fixed in Code Review ACK 0e2a5e4. Mainly reviewed change since my last review in at 84ec One thing I'm still inquiring is scope of test coverage. I've started to look at it only now and it's still trying to map if every spec object is correctly covered. I'll try if I can come with any comment improvement suggestion.
I'm not sure how to read this description compared to the effective return. See All of this was just outdated, thanks for noticing. Added in Like "Exclude parity bit from internal pubkey". I added a bunch of comments around this in The first byte contains both the leaf version and the parity bit, btw.
As a side-note, it could be worthy to document what is meaned here by "syntactic correctness" if it's consensus criticial. Added comments in Can future upgradable public key define their own sigops rules without branching inside the if success branch?
They can certainly define their own cost rules, as long as the cost is at least 50 vbytes per check. I'm not sure what you mean by "without branching". If a future softforked new pubkey type comes with its own new ratio test, maybe the code structure isn't going to be adequate?
Can we enforce this assign-once property with either some cpp magic or compiler option? I've no idea. I'm sure there are ways to solve these softforkability guarantees more generically by encapsulating modifiable properties in an object Concept ACK 0e2a5e4. Skip to content. New issue. Jump to bottom. Copy link Quote reply. Copy link. Member Author. The verification side of the BIP test vectors is also added. No corresponding CTxDestination is added for it, as that isn't needed until we want wallet integration.
The taproot validation flags are also enabled for mempool transactions, and standardness rules are added stack item size limit, no annexes. No activation or activation mechanism is defined for testnet or mainnet. The test data is large several MB so it's stored in the qa-assets repo.
A fuzzer for said format is added as well, whose primary purpose is coverage-based minimization of those dumps. View changes. I was surprised to learn that this was a line PR. This was referenced Sep 19, Introduce deploymentstatus External signer support - Wallet Box edition Make script interpreter independent from storage type CScript Define a versionbits-based activation for the new consensus rules on regtest. Includes sighashing code and many tests by Johnson Lau.
Includes a test by Matthew Zipkin. Includes several tests and improvements by Greg Sanders. Sign in to view. Going to leave this for a follow-up, as it's not directly related to Taproot testing. In order to prevent these from depending solely on the key itself, we extend both private and public keys first with an extra bits of entropy. This extension, called the chain code, is identical for corresponding private and public keys, and consists of 32 bytes.
We represent an extended private key as k, c , with k the normal private key, and c the chain code. Each extended key has 2 31 normal child keys, and 2 31 hardened child keys. Each of these child keys has an index. The normal child keys use indices 0 through 2 31 The hardened child keys use indices 2 31 through 2 32 Given a parent extended key and an index i, it is possible to compute the corresponding child extended key.
It is only defined for non-hardened child keys. The fact that they are equivalent is what makes non-hardened keys useful one can derive child public keys of a given parent key without knowing any private key , and also what distinguishes them from hardened keys. The reason for not always using non-hardened keys which are more useful is security; see further for more information. The next step is cascading several CKD constructions to build a tree.
We start with one root, the master extended key m. By evaluating CKDpriv m,i for several values of i, we get a number of level-1 derived nodes. As each of these is again an extended key, CKDpriv can be applied to those as well. This results in the following identities:. Each leaf node in the tree corresponds to an actual key, while the internal nodes correspond to the collections of keys that descend from them. The chain codes of the leaf nodes are ignored, and only their embedded private or public key is relevant.
Because of this construction, knowing an extended private key allows reconstruction of all descendant private keys and public keys, and knowing an extended public keys allows reconstruction of all descendant non-hardened public keys. This corresponds exactly to the data used in traditional Bitcoin addresses. It is not advised to represent this data in base58 format though, as it may be interpreted as an address that way and wallet software is not required to accept payment to the chain key itself.
This 78 byte structure can be encoded like other Bitcoin data in Base58, by first adding 32 checksum bits derived from the double SHA checksum , and then converting to the Base58 representation. This results in a Baseencoded string of up to characters. Because of the choice of the version bytes, the Base58 representation will start with "xprv" or "xpub" on mainnet, "tprv" or "tpub" on testnet. Note that the fingerprint of the parent only serves as a fast way to detect parent and child nodes in software, and software must be willing to deal with collisions.
Internally, the full bit identifier could be used. When importing a serialized extended public key, implementations must verify whether the X coordinate in the public key data corresponds to a point on the curve.
If not, the extended public key is invalid. The total number of possible extended keypairs is almost 2 , but the produced keys are only bits long, and offer about half of that in terms of security. Therefore, master keys are not generated directly, but instead from a potentially short seed value. The previous sections specified key trees and their nodes. The next step is imposing a wallet structure on this tree. The layout defined in this section is a default only, though clients are encouraged to mimic it for compatibility, even if not all features are supported.
An HDW is organized as several 'accounts'. Accounts are numbered, the default account "" being number 0. Clients are not required to support more than one account - if not, they only use the default account. Each account is composed of two keypair chains: an internal and an external one. The external keychain is used to generate new public addresses, while the internal keychain is used for all other operations change addresses, generation addresses, Clients that do not support separate keychains for these should use the external one for everything.
In cases where two systems need to access a single shared wallet, and both need to be able to perform spendings, one needs to share the master private extended key. Nodes can keep a pool of N look-ahead keys cached for external chains, to watch for incoming payments.
The look-ahead for internal chains can be very small, as no gaps are to be expected here. An extra look-ahead could be active for the first unused account's chains - triggering the creation of a new account when used.
Note that the name of the account will still need to be entered manually and cannot be synchronized via the block chain. In case an auditor needs full access to the list of incoming and outgoing payments, one can share all account public extended keys.
This will allow the auditor to see all transactions from and to the wallet, in all accounts, but not a single secret key. When a business has several independent offices, they can all use wallets derived from a single master. This will allow the headquarters to maintain a super-wallet that sees all incoming and outgoing transactions of all offices, and even permit moving money between the offices.