Knowledge btctalk

Posted by Maurn

Organized sets of principles and facts applying in general domains. Administration and Management — Knowledge of business and management principles involved in strategic planning, resource allocation, human resources modeling, leadership technique, production . Knowledge represents a study of some body of lore, possibly an academic or even scientific discipline. Below are listed typical fields of study. Arcana (ancient mysteries, magic traditions, arcane symbols, cryptic phrases, constructs, dragons, magical beasts) Architecture and engineering (buildings, aqueducts, bridges, fortifications). Jul 23,  · Understanding the different types of knowledge - and in particular the difference between explicit and tacit knowledge - is a key step in promoting knowledge sharing, choosing the right information or knowledge management system, and implementing KM initiatives.

Knowledge btctalk

Theory of Knowledge: An Alternative Approach – Why is an alternative approach necessary?

We mean that the person is designing; he uses others to further his own self-interests. Such a person is not sincere: there is an ulterior motive, a self-interested purpose behind all his actions and relations. He is engaged with others only for what he can get out of them. His being-in-the-world may be said to rest on the principle attributed to H.

It is an attitude and approach that the things are there for what we can get out of them. People and things are there for us to exploit. This general outlook is determined by the disclosive looking of technology and its impositional attitude toward things.

There is no lack of calculative thinking in our world today: never has there been so much planning, so much problem-solving, so much research, so many machinations. TOK itself is a branch and flowering of this calculative thinking. But in this calculative thought, human beings are in flight from thinking. The thinking that we are in flight from is contemplative thinking, the very essence of our being human. In this flight, we are very much like Oedipus who, after hearing the omen from the oracle at Delphi and its prophecy, rashly flees in the hope that he can escape his destiny.

Contemplative thinking, on the other hand, is the attention to what is closet to us. It pays attention to the meaning of things, the essence of things. It does not have a practical interest and does not view things as a means to an end but, much like Lear and Cordelia, dwells on the things for the sake of disclosing what makes them be what they are. This seeing and looking is not a redemption that is easily achieved. King Lear in his anagnorisis has arrived at the truth of what it means to be, as such, and of his place in that Being.

Contemplative thinking is a paying attention to what makes beings be beings at all, but it is not a redemption which can be cheaply bought. It is a communing with the divine. The temple is where those who gather receive messages from the divine. Within a temple, one receives auguries. An augury is an omen, a being which bears a divine message which must be heard by those to whom it is spoken.

Contemplation is the observing of beings just as they exist and is an attending to their essence. It is a reserved, detached mode of disclosing that expresses itself in gratitude, the giving of thanks. This attention is available to all human beings who through their love, like Lear and Cordelia, are open to the otherness of beings without viewing those beings as serving any other purpose than their own being. For human beings, it is the highest form of action directed by what the essence of human being is.

As the highest form of human being itself, it must be available to all since it is our very nature as human beings. What we wish to show is that this understanding of ourselves and of what we think knowledge to be has great implications for our human being-in-the- world and our destiny or fate as beings as we totter towards the apogee of what and how we see through the technological world-view. It then came to apply to literary and mental formation.

A projection is not a particular plan or project; it is what makes any plan or project possible. It is not determined by our prior knowledge or desires, since it is only in the light of a project that we can have any specific knowledge or desires. A project is not projected piecemeal, by gradual steps, but all at once, by a leap ahead so it is prior to reasoning and algorithmic thought.

There are three main types of project. Any Human Being must project a world and have a pre-ontological understanding of being, i. This projection enables Human Being to understand, for example, what a tool is or what another person is, independently of the particular tools and persons it encounters.

The projection is how we can even conceive of the journey towards knowledge in the metaphor of a map. Such a project is not grounded in the experience of beings: the project decides in advance what counts as a being and as experience. Nor is it grounded in a previous project or in criticism of it: a new project is not commensurable with its predecessor; it alters our whole view of being and beings.

A mathematical physicist still needs a pre-ontological understanding of tools, people, time, etc. As we attempt to think in TOK we acquire a conceptual, ontological understanding of being, which involves an understanding of the projects outlined above.

It is not enough to simply painstakingly describe these projects without a prior specifically determined projection. We must project a being e. We might want to understand this as what we call the Reduction Thesis. We understand beings by projecting them onto Being.

We understand Being by projecting it onto time. Time is prior to being and makes it possible; Being is prior to beings and makes them possible. What a tool is such as a map; other people; that there is a world: these are apriori within the project, and thus for every Human Being. That things are exactly measurable: this is apriori for mathematical physics. The apriori and its priority are interpreted in accordance with our conception of the thinghood of the thing and our understanding of the being of beings in general.

Thus in projecting, human being always projects itself on its possibilities, though the range of possibilities varies depending on whether human being is resolute or not. In doing this it understands itself in terms of the possibilities open to it. Human being projects itself in its own project — one of the meanings of the claim that a project is thrown forward.

Human being does not have a constant, project-independent understanding of itself: it first understands itself, or understands itself anew, after the projection.

The mathematical projection of nature is the broadest in scope, and it is at the core of the methodologies in the sciences and the conceptual tools used in the sciences. This projection predetermines the ontology or the Being of the things encountered in experience: it predetermines what and how things are, how we view a tree, a rock, a child or a road.

The mathematical projection does not occur out of nowhere or out of nothing. But, of course, there is no such object or body and no experiment could help us to bring to view such a body.

The law speaks of a thing that does not exist and demands a fundamental representation of things that contradicts our ordinary common sense and our ordinary everyday experience. The mathematical projection of a thing is based on the determination of things that is not derived from our experience of things.

This fundamental conception of things is not arbitrary nor self-evident. Galileo, for instance, provides the decisive insight that all bodies fall equally fast, and that differences in the time of fall derive from the resistance of the air and not from the inner natures of the bodies themselves or because of their corresponding relation to their particular place contrary to how the world was understood by Aristotle and the Medievals.

The particular, specific qualities of the thing, so crucial to Aristotle, become a matter of indifference to Galileo. This results in what has been given in a detailed account in another place, that the motion of the body over this plane would be uniform and perpetual if the plane were extended infinitely. There is a prior grasping in the mind, a r epresentation of what should be uniformly determinative of the bodily as such, what the thing is.

All bodies are alike. No motion is special. Every place is like every other place. Every force is determinable only by the change of motion which it causes, the change of motion being the change of place. This fundamental design of nature creates the blueprint wherein nature is everywhere uniform. The project or projection first opens a domain, an area of knowledge, where the things i. What and how things or facts are to be understood and evaluated beforehand is what the Greeks termed axiomata i.

This prescription regarding the being of beings goes to the very essence and structure of beings,, what they are and how they are; 4. It established a uniform field in which all entities will be encountered; 5. And finally, it establishes measurement, in particular numerical measurement, as the uniform determinant of things. As what we call thinking and cognition in the sciences is expressed in propositions, the cognition the way of seeing, the beholding in the mathematical project is of such a kind as to set things upon their foundations in advance; they are defined and delimited in advance.

Because the mathematical project is axiomatic, what things are as bodies is taken in advance and the mathematical project becomes the basic blueprint schema, framework of the structure of every thing and its relation to every other thing in advance.

What the thing will be and can be is determined in advance. Unlike in Aristotle, nature is no longer an inner capacity of a body determining its form of motion and its place; circular motion is of no greater dignity than rectilinear motion. With Galileo and Newton, Nature now becomes the realm of uniform space-time with regard to the context or place of uniform masses in motion which are outlined in the project and within which alone bodies can be bodies as part of it and anchored or positioned within it.

Nature as understood within the axiomatically pre-determined mathematical project requires a mode of access to the objects that have been thus determined. A new form of questioning and conceptual thinking is required. Bodies have no concealed qualities, powers, and capacities.

Natural bodies are only what they show themselves as within this projected realm i. Because inquiry is now pre-determined by the axiomatic outline of the project, how we question and inquire is determined in advance and nature must answer one way or another. Because the mathematical project has established a uniformity of all bodies according to relations of space, time, and motion, it also makes possible and requires a universal uniform measure as an essential determinant of things i.

The new form of modern science of Galileo and Newton, Descartes and Leibniz did not arise because mathematics became an essential determinant within it. The particular type of mathematics had to come into play as a consequence of the mathematical projection, of how the things can be known and taught. The founding of analytic geometry by Descartes, infinitesimal calculus by Newton, and differential calculus by Leibniz are not the causes of the mathematical projection that is the paradigm shift from the ancient to the modern, but its necessary consequences.

What is provided here is merely an outline within which unfolds the entire manner in which we pose questions and experiments, establish laws in our politics, and disclose new areas of things in order for us to have knowledge of them. The questions regarding space and time, motion and force, body and matter remain open and we are attempting to discuss them here in TOK.

Every manner of thinking is a doing, a carrying out, that is a consequence of our manner of being-in-the-world, of the fundamental position that we take towards beings so that they show themselves and, thus, their truth. It is fundamentally ethical. It is the hypothesis that modern natural science, in all of its manifestations, is ontologically dependent on mathematical physics. This connection of mathematics to physics and of physics to mathematics is a limitation which both physics and mathematics cannot overcome.

Experiments in Physics must report their results in the language of mathematics if they are to provide certainty. The world, in ascending order of complexity, is composed of elementary particles states of energy , higher, more complex, structures such as those observed by chemistry, yet more complex ones such as organisms, and, lastly, human beings and their institutions. Analogously, the sciences can be rank-ordered in corresponding fashion with mathematical physics at one end the Group 4 subjects and, at the other, the sciences concerned with the human: anthropology, sociology, psychology, and political science, among others the Group 3 subjects.

It is not just the new method of the physical sciences which warrants the scientific character of the modem science of politics, for instance. And, as we have stated, Jacob Klein in his book Greek Mathematics and the Origin of Algebra takes us a long way in understanding a deep-seated conceptual connection between method and ontology in modem consciousness which reveals and discloses this dual authority of modern natural science in our Cave.

Technology and the Human Sciences Pt. The mathematika are extracted from the physika onta , from what immediately shows itself. But within mathematics itself, the distinction between arithmetic and geometry will prove to be of crucial importance for the later development of modern mathematics. The distinction between geometry and arithmetic clarifies the opposition between the two.

Monas , unit, is the solitary element of arithmetic; the most basic concern of geometry, however, is stigme , the point, which is a monas with a thesis added to it. The difference between the kinds of abstraction taking place in geometry and arithmetic are exemplified in the ways each relates the basic units of its operation to one another: for Aristotle, neither number nor the line is merely a construction of ones or points.

What is the connection between a one and a two? While geometrical objects retain some similarity to those physical objects from which they are derived, for example the quality of continuous extension, Aristotle derives his understanding of continuity not from geometry itself but from his reflections on physics. This basic phenomenon is the ontological condition for the possibility of something like extension, megethos.

The addition of a thesis typical of geometry ensures that, in positing the continuum, the quality of extension can be understood. But although arithmetic is dependent on sufficiently few archai , Aristotle does not admit it as the science of beings because its genuine arche , monas , is itself no longer a number i.

PS 83 With that Aristotle, and Heidegger, turn to sophia as the genuine candidate for the science of being. The res corporea or bodies are characterized above all by extension — size, length, thickness, etc. That which is accessible in an entity through mathematics , makes up its Being. Against the famous example of the melting wax, Heidegger retorts that the continuation across time of the malleable substance tells us nothing ontologically interesting about it — thus being is either inaccessible as such which neither party is prepared to accept or extension itself does not reveal being.

The first example seeks to undermine the certain grasp of entities in the world; the second undermines the self-knowledge of the subject. Theory, Heidegger notes, is not a simple withdrawal from or absence of engaged physical praxis ; rather, it has a kind of praxis all its own, BT whether highly specialized as in the preparation of archaeological experiments, or simplistic measurements of a hammer which seems too heavy.

BT It would take Kant to ground these views. The link between metaphysics and the mathematical is shown in the rise of the mathematical and marks the emergence of a self-grounding knowledge, a self-binding form of obligation, and a new experience of freedom as such as is demonstrated in the works of Descartes.

The problems of Cartesian philosophy and modern metaphysics in general are not only philosophical problems, but ontological problems as well. Simone Weil. To understand the statement above, one must see it in the light of Plato. It has been said, with some justice, that every philosopher is either a Platonist or an Aristotelian, and there is no doubt that Simone Weil is a Platonist and was hostile to Aristotle.

What can it mean to say that things such as health and fitness, food and drink, property and progeny, are illusory goods? We wish to look for counterclaims to positions that we have been given in our social and cultural contexts, in our education, for our goal is to attempt to get beyond our Caves.

The quest for knowledge is a moral impulse. The essence of education is liberation. Human beings will have their gods whether they recognize them or not; the goal of liberation or education is to ensure that one is not worshiping false gods.

They are the products of what that kind of thinking which the Greeks understood as phronesis establishes. If nothing else, one has decided to leave off investigating the matter. One has chosen, like some of the prisoners in the Cave, to return to the realm of the shadows. In most cases, it is our social and cultural contexts, our shared or historical knowledge, which grounds our de-cisions and our ceasing to inquire and to reflect. What does it mean to say that the world of the senses is the world of shadows in the Cave and what relation does this have to knowledge and religion?

The Idea of the Good is that which imparts to things their goodness. So with all the things of the world: what is good in them is given by the idea of the Good, but is not the Good itself. Because human beings are by nature the religious animal in that they are capable of being moved by gods, we can approach the question of what is most important with regard to knowledge and religion via the notion of idolatry.

The essence of idolatry lies in the absolutizing of the relative, or of the universalizing of the particular. A finite good becomes an idol when it is treated as if it were an infinite good, i. That our desire is infinite is shown by the fact that it is never satisfied by any finite object or series of finite objects.

Ultimately, all desire, all need is the desire or need for the Absolute. A desire or need that understood itself, that was transparent to itself, would understand this fact about itself.

But our deluded desire thinks it can find satisfaction in the finite. Therein lies the root of idolatry. We give our love to that which is not deserving of our love. Yet Eros, and our experience of Eros is, curiously, both infinite and temporal. Contrary to the Buddhist belief that all being is suffering, in the West, this has been seen in the figure of eros or need. Both Plato and the Buddha see this desire in the element or metaphor of Fire, a fire that does not extinguish itself.

No desire or need is finally sated; each is reborn in a later desire. See, for example, the discussion of King Lear on the wheel and its relation to the Pythagorean doctrine under Mathematics and Religion. The more one is driven by the appetites looking for the ultimate satisfaction, the more frustrated one becomes.

So the Buddha understood the nature of desire or need as infinite in the needing human being. Idolatry arises when some finite foreground object is falsely ascribed the power to provide ultimate satisfaction. This de-cision of our sciences is a closing down rather than an opening up of the world of perception. The distinction between Buddhism and the thinking that originated in the West is that for Socrates and Plato the world is conceived as good.

The drawing power of eros is necessary for us to be led to the Good, and this drawing power is the beauty of the world. The world itself is a souvenir, a remembrance or reminder of the ultimate Good of which it is a testimony. Again, think of it as a photograph of someone we love. The photo is a reminder of the being who draws our love, but is not the real person themselves. This world and all its goods are but a reminder of the ultimate Good itself.

Our error lies in mistaking the two as identical. For Plato, there is the presence of the Good in all things that are; and this good is given to us through the perception of the Beautiful which, in its erotic power, draws us towards the Good itself. Beauty is in the eye of the beholder, no? To love the finite as infinite is to go beyond the limits to attempt to exceed the circumference of the circle and is, essentially, hubristic. Eros is both god and mediator, both finite and infinite as Christ Himself becomes in Christianity.

He who sees the Infinite in all things sees God. He who sees the Ratio only sees himself only. Therefore God becomes as we are, that we may be as he is. To counteract this, the Prophetic character of the imagination was, for Blake, required.

As we shall see, we have a relation to the self only insofar as we have a relation to others. The principle of reason holds that each and every thing that is, no matter how it is, has a reason. Whatever happens to be actual has a reason for its actuality. Whatever happens to be possible has a reason for its possibility. Whatever happens to be necessary has a reason for its necessity. We require reasons for the assertions that we make in knowledge claims.

We insist upon a foundation for every attitude when we explore our emotions and how these emotions shape and determine, attune, our human cognition, our processing of contents. It is from within this principle of reason that we determine who among us is sane and who among us is not. In our search for reasons we begin with the immediate reasons for the things in front of us and then proceed to attempt to get to the bottom of, or ground of, the more remote reasons and, finally, ask about the ultimate reason.

Nothing happens without a reason: nothing happens without a cause. Every cause is in some way a reason. Not every reason brings about something in the way of causation, however. As we shall see, the principle of reason is not the same as the principle of causality; it is broader and encompasses the principle of causality.

The principle of reason requires that reasons must be rendered for all that is. The rendering of reasons is carried out through logos or language as a way of knowing. Logos is any type of rendering; it is not merely that which can be expressed in words. We need to explain three questions that arise from this: 1. How come a reason must be rendered in the first place, that is, explicitly brought forward?

The German philosopher Gottfried Leibniz was the first to formulate the principle of reason as a statement and as a principle in the 17 th century. He insisted that it was the principle. What does it mean? Why did it take so long in the history of ideas and philosophy for this statement to be uttered and why was it written in Latin by Leibniz? Judgement is the connection of what is stated with that about which the statement is made. We call this the correspondence theory of truth.

What the statement indicates is that which, as the unifying unity of subject and predicate, supports their being connected is the basis, the ground of judgement: it gives a justification for the connection. Reason renders an account of the truth of judgement. There is a connection between reason and language here. The ground of the truth of judgement is represented as ratio. The first principle for Leibniz is the fundamental principle of rendering reasons.

If an account is not given, a judgement remains without justification. It lacks evidence of its correctness. The judgement itself is not truth. Judgement only becomes truth when the reason for the connection is specified and accounted for, when the ratio, that is, an account, is given. Such a giving of an account is in need of a site where the account can be delivered and rendered.

This site may be as formal as an experiment or an essay or an exhibition, or it can be as informal as a statement made over coffee and donuts. The rendering of reasons is because reason is ratio , an account. If it is not given, the judgment remains without justification. It lacks the evidence , the support or the ground, for its correctness.

In answer to the third question: to whom or to what must reasons be rendered, the answer is to human beings who determine objects as objects by way of a representation that judges. An account is an account only if it is handed over. A reason is a reason to be rendered. But a rendered reason only effects such a bringing-to-a-stand of objects when it gives in a sufficient way an account that is adequate for the secure establishing of objects.

This is the principle behind all assessments in the IB Diploma and in all human cognition in general. Doing well or not doing well in your assessments is whether or not you have sufficiently rendered the reasons in securely establishing the object about which you are making assertions whether it be in mathematical equations or in writing the TOK essay.

Of and for what? So that in every way and for everyone it can bring an object to stand in the entirety of its stance. The completeness of the reasons to be rendered— perfectio— is what guarantees that something is firmly established—secured in its place—as an object for human cognition. Only the completeness of the account, perfection , vouches for the fact that every cognition everywhere and at all times can include and count on the object and reckon with it.

It is the principle of reason that gives security to the woman in Moscow, Idaho and the man in Moscow, Russia that their proceedings in their experiments or their mathematical propositions are correct. The principle now says that every thing counts as existing when and only when it has been securely established as a calculable object for cognition.

The Greeks, for example, never had any theories of aesthetics. They did not view or experience their art in the manner we are asked to experience it. What Leibniz is saying here is that human cognition is governed by the principle of reason and is under its power. Cognition becomes Rational and governed by Reason.

Reckoning is the way humans take up something, deal with it, and take it on; how, in general, human beings perceive something. Ratio is a manner of perceiving, which means, it is Reason. Rational cognition follows the principle of reason. Reason first fully develops its essence what it is as Reason through the principle of reason. The principle of reason is the fundamental principle of Rational cognition in the sense of a reckoning an accounting that securely establishes something.

One speaks of rational grounds, of evidence. But we are not fully aware of how the principle of reason operates in our day-to-day activities. We see the evidence of the principle of reason in our technology as it drives forward the bringing of its contrivances and products to an all-encompassing greatest possible perfection. Perfection consists in the completeness of the calculably secure establishing of objects, in the completeness of reckoning with them, and with the securing of the calculability of possibilities for reckoning.

Our contrivances and products computers and hand phones, for instance are not merely instruments, equipment and tools like hammers and pens. The contrivances and products of technology rest on the understanding of the world about us that has become secure in its calculability. It is this securing of the disposability of the objects about us which brings algebraic calculation to its height as the determination of what is considered knowledge in our age. This knowledge comes about through the applications of the methodologies in the various AOKs which follow the principle of reason.

The striving for perfection in our technology is an echo of the demand for perfectio which means here the completeness of a foundation. The principle of reason is a striving which demands the rendering of sufficient reasons for all that is.

Perfection is based on the thoroughgoing calculability of objects. The calculability of objects presupposes the validity of the principle of reason.

The authority of the principle of reason determines the essence of the modern, technological age and it empowers the modern age. What role does human freedom play in this ceaseless technological striving for perfection? In our personal knowledge and how we experience our lives, we must come to terms with the distinction between calculative thinking and reflective thinking.

We shall attempt to determine the distinction between the calculative thinking which the principle of reason prescribes and reflective thinking. So it is that in our age the representation of language as an instrument of information has come to dominance and shows itself in our attempts to create machines with artificial intelligence and ever bigger, greater, more efficient computing frameworks with capacities for ever larger calculations.

As data, it ceases to be an independently standing object. The principle of reason requires that all that is encountered is understood as data. What is the consequence of seeing and hearing language and speaking as information? Because of this hearing and speaking, the possibility of a thoughtful conversation with a tradition that is considered to be our shared knowledge, a shared knowledge that could invigorate and nurture us, is lacking. Because language has been consigned to information, reflective thinking is pushed aside and is considered as something useless and superfluous.

What is the relation of the principle of reason to our personal knowledge and what we have come to call empowerment? The principle of reason governs all modern thought and action in the sense that it makes all modern thought and its consequences possible. Inquiry question: How does technology, when viewed as merely instruments and tools that are used in assisting human beings to achieve their ends or in other human activities,, obfuscate the ethical issues that arise from within it?

As anyone who is involved in the top level of the informational technological sciences can tell us, it is impossible to work in the field without engaging in social engineering or cybernetics. The instrumental view of technology sees technology as a tool like any other and that it can be used for good or ill.

The view of information technology examined here arrives from the view of reason and nature that came from these mastering sciences. The ethical implications should be made clear from this understanding of what allowed the technological to become possible. It is these technological products and activities techniques that we view as what technology itself is, but this view is insufficient. The situation in which we find ourselves currently seems obvious: we are faced with calamities concerning climate, the environment, population, resources, and pollution if we continue to pursue the policies that we have pursued over the last few centuries.

The attempts to deal with these interlocking emergencies will require a vast array of skills and knowledge; and that is what most of you are being educated towards. Technological mastery will need to be used to solve the problems that technology has created. The focus of this mastery will be in the human sciences with efforts to change human behaviour. As the German philosopher Martin Heidegger has pointed out, the governing and determining science of the future is inevitably going to be cybernetics.

The realization of the cybernetic future will find its place most securely in the medical profession, particularly the biomedical field.

It established a hierarchy. The task in TOK is thus a negative one: to allow the concepts to come to light in their essence so that we may be free for something positive beyond them. This discussion arises from our radio show from last year, in which our two guests, experts in information technologies, both held the instrumental view of technology: that the information technology does not impose on us the ways that they should be used.

They believed that human beings have the command and choice to determine whether information technologies will be used for good or ill. The statements made by these men came from their intimate knowledge of information technology.

But such a statement transcends that intimacy in the sense that the statement is more than a description of any given information technology or what is technically common to them as machines; the question goes beyond hardware and software. Because our guests wished to make statements about the possible good or evil purposes for which information technologies can be used, they expressed what information technologies are in a way which is more than a technical description.

According to our guests, they are instruments made by human skill for the purpose of achieving certain human goals. In expressing the instrumental view of technology, we can see that information technologies are obviously instruments because their capacities have been built into them by human beings; and it is human beings who must set up the operating of those capacities for the purposes that they have determined.

All instruments can potentially be used for wicked purposes and the more complex the instrument, the more complex the possible evils. But if we apprehend information technologies for what they are, as neutral instruments, according to these gentlemen we are better able to determine rationally their potential dangers. That is clearly the first step in coping with these dangers. We can see that these dangers lie in the potential decisions human beings make about how to use information technologies, and not to the inherent capacities of the machines themselves.

This view is the instrumental view of most of us regarding technology and it is so strongly given to us that it seems common sense itself. It is the box. We are given an historical situation which includes certain objective technological facts. Yet, clearly, information technologies are more than their capacities or capabilities. They are put together from a variety of materials, beautifully fashioned by a vast apparatus of fashioners.

Their existence has required generations of sustained efforts by chemists, metallurgists, and workers in mines and factories. They require a highly developed electronics industry and the physics that lies behind that industry in the history of science and technique and their reciprocal relations.

They have required that human beings wanted to understand nature, and thought the best way to do so was by putting it to the question as object so that it could reveal itself. They have required the discovery of modern algebra and the development of complex institutions for developing and applying that algebra. Nor should this be seen as a one-sided relationship in which the institutions necessary to the development of the machines were left unchanged by the discovery of algebra here I am speaking of the universities and the more recent colleges of applied arts and technology.

To understand our educational system is to know that the desire for these machines shapes our institutions at their heart in our curriculum, in what the young you are encouraged to know and do any view of the universal student choices in Group subjects in the IB Diploma indicates this. This means and entails that those who rule any modern society will take the purposes of ruling increasingly to be congruent with this account of knowing.

Information technologies are, obviously, within modern common sense, instruments, and instruments are always things which are made to be at human disposal. Information technologies are one kind of technology. Two Greek words, techne and logos are brought together in a combination that would have been unthinkable until recently. Look at the Mac Book Pros, hand phones and tablets in front of us and one can see the flowering of this reciprocal relationship.

In comparing the discovery of fire to the making of information technologies, our guests hid from us not in any malevolent way what we have to understand if we are to understand technology, as if the instrumentality of modern technologies could be morally neutral. This account of information technology as neutral rises up in the statement, in opposition to that neutrality, an account of human freedom which is just as novel as our new instruments. Human freedom is conceived in the strong sense of human beings as autonomous—the makers of our own laws and our own selves.

This is also a quite new conception. It is first thought systematically in the writings of the German philosopher Immanuel Kant.

It is also a conception without which the coming-to-be of our modern civilization would not and could not have been. But it is a conception the truth of which needs to be thought because it was not considered true by wise men of many civilizations before our own. The facts of our day-to-day instruction are abstracted so that they may be classified.

Where classification rules, identities and differences can only appear in its terms results as data. Classification is used by us both in our desire to know but also because of the convenience of organization. The point being made here is simply that the statement about information technologies tends to hide the fact that their very capabilities entail that the ways they can be used are never neutral.

They can only be used in homogenizing ways. And the question about the goodness of homogenization or decentralization is excluded from thinking about the essence of technology.

All of us have experienced the inconvenience in this part of the world of societies in which the automobile has not, as of yet, come to dominate. Societies where automobiles dominate tend to be much the same as each other and we find these societies much more efficient and convenient for ourselves. But also, if we represent the automobile as a neutral instrument, we have abstracted the productive functions of Honda, Toyota and General Motors or Standard Oil and the other major oil conglomerates from their political and social functions, just as their public relations people would want.

Moreover, we would have abstracted the automobile from the relations between such corporations and the public and private corporations of other countries.

This belief can be described as the good progress of the race in the direction of the universal society of free and equal human beings, that is, towards the universal and homogeneous state.

The followers of this religion of progress assert that the technology, which comes out of the account of reason given in the modern European sciences, is the necessary and good means to that end. In the thought of the French philosopher Rousseau about the origins of human beings, the concept of reason as historical makes its extraordinary public arrival.

The German philosopher Heidegger has said that capitalism and communism are simply predicates of the subject technology: the Presidents of the USA and China float down the same river technology in different boats political ends. This common source is technology understood as a way of knowing the world and as a way of being-in-the-world.

Because we are trying to understand reason in the very form of how we understand reason is what makes it so difficult; that is, we are trying to use reason to grasp the essence of reason.

This principle of reason is the box that we are required to try to somehow to think out of. It is an occurrence that has not yet been understood, and it is an event that must come to be thought here in TOK. Information technologies do not present us with neutral means for building any kind of society. What is, then, the nature of the debt spoken?

To what or to whom do we human beings owe it? Is the debt conditional? To ourselves? To other human beings? To evolution? To nature? To history? To reasonableness? To God? Macbeth, for example, knows that he should not kill Duncan. OT 1: Knowledge and Technology. Obviously, we come upon the claims of others and our creating may be limited particularly by the state because of what is currently permitted to be done to others.

However, such claims whether within states or internationally, are seen as contractual, that is, provisional. The arrival in the world of this changed interpretation of goodness is interrelated to the arrival of technological civilization. This is only possible with the conception of technology as instrument. It is a word carried over from the past to be used in a present that is only ours because the assumptions of that past were criticized out of existence. The statement therefore cushions us from the full impact of the uniqueness it asks us to consider.

Technological society is presented to us as a neutral means, something outside ourselves, and human beings are presented as in touch with some constant or permanence, from out of which they are called upon to deal with the new external crises.

But obviously, all that is given us in the technological sciences denies that constancy or permanence, that standard, that eternality. What happens is that constancy is appealed to in practical life and denied in intellectual life. Ontology refers to our way of being in the world. Every scientific discovery or application emerges from an ontology which so engrosses us that it can be called our Western destiny.

Technology is not something over against ontology; it is the ontology and metaphysic of the age. It is for us an almost inescapable destiny. The question is: what is the ontology which is declared in technology since technological civilization enfolds us as our destiny?

Coming to meet us out of the very substance of our past, that destiny has now become not only our own but that of the species as a whole. Moreover, this destiny is not alone concerned with such obvious problems that we can blow ourselves up or can cure diabetes or have widespread freedom from labour or watch our distant wars on television or other media devices.

It is a destiny that presents us with what we think of the whole, with what we think is good, with what we think the good is, with how we conceive insanity and madness, beauty and ugliness. It is a destiny which enfolds us in our most immediate experiences: what we perceive when we encounter a bird or a tree, a child, or a road.

This destiny is not one in which we can pick and choose: it is a package deal. Having an opportunity to change this definition of National Socialism in with the publication of An Introduction to Metaphysics, Heidegger chose not to do so.

Questions: Is absolute certainty attainable in mathematics? Is there a distinction between truth and certainty in mathematics? Should mathematics be defined as a language? What does it mean to say that mathematics is an axiomatic system?

How is an axiomatic system of knowledge different from, or similar to, other systems of knowledge? An axiom is a statement that is taken to be true, and serves as a premise or starting point for further reasoning and arguments. The axiomatic ground-plan or blueprint for all things allows the things to become accessible, to be able to be known, by establishing a relation between ourselves to them. But today, the relation of the knower to what is known is only of the kind of calculable thinking that conforms to this plan which is established beforehand and projected onto the things that are.

One sees the effect of this framing in our language and the texting that is now a popular mode of discourse for us. The mathematics and its use of number and symbol that we study in Group 5 is a response to but does not ground our will to axiomatic knowledge i. Modern mathematics, modern natural science and modern metaphysics all sprang from the same root that is the mathematical projection in the widest sense.

This grid, this mathematical projection, is at the mysterious heart of what is understood as technology in these writings. Modern Natural Science physics, chemistry, biology is dependent on mathematical physics. Science is the theory of the real. The world, in ascending order of complexity, is composed of elementary particles states of energy , higher, more complex, structures such as those observed by chemistry, yet more complex ones such as organisms that are observed in biology, and, lastly, human beings and their institutions the Human Sciences.

In a similar fashion, the sciences can be rank-ordered in a corresponding way with mathematical physics at one end and, at the other, the sciences concerned with the human: sociology, psychology, political science, among others which require more than simple mathematical results.

Can mathematical physics make such a claim i. In the narrower sense, representation refers to the operations of the mind as it deals with concepts as well as its reflections on those operations, such as what we are trying to do here in TOK.

We will examine the narrower sense here. We shall try to do this with a reflection on the nature of number.

The modern concept of number, on the other hand, while remaining initially faithful to this Greek meaning, yields an ontology or a way of being-in-the-world of a very different sort. Five or cinq or penta can refer to either five apples or five people or five pixels, but it must refer to a definite number of definite things.

Similar considerations hold for geometry. For the Greeks, the objects of counting or of geometry are, if considered by the arithmetical or geometrical arts, in principle, incorporeal, without body. Hence a question arises as to their mode of existence. We say that computers can be said to know things because their memories contain information; however, they do not know that they know these things in that we have no evidence that they can reflect on the state of their knowledge.

Much of human behaviour can be understood in a similar manner: we carry out actions without really knowing what the actions are or what the actions intend. Intentionality is the term that is used to refer to the state of having a state of mind knowing, believing, thinking, wanting, intending, etc and these states may only be found in animate things. In these writings these states are referred to as Being or ontology. So first-order intentionality refers to the mind directed towards those beings or things which are nearby, ready-to-hand.

They are the concepts that we use to understand the non-mental or material things. Second-order intentions deal with abstract, mental constructs. Much discussion of this is to be found in Medieval philosophy in their attempts to understand Aristotle.

According to the Greeks number refers directly, without mediation, to individual objects, to things, whether apples or monads. Number, thus, is a concept which refers to mind-independent objects. The Greek concept of number, arithmos , as stated in, say, penta, is a first intention i. It is what we have been calling the mathematical projection here. Symbolic mathematics, as in post-Cartesian algebra, is not merely a more general or more abstract form of mathematical presentation.

It involves a wholly new understanding of abstraction which becomes a wholly new understanding of what it means for the mind to have access to general concepts i. Let us look at how this came about. We think that a letter sign is a mere notational convenience a symbol in the ordinary sense of the word in our day whose function is to allow for a greater generality of reference to the things it refers to.

Every number refers to a definite multitude of things, not only for ancient mathematicians but also for Viete. It is through language, and as language, that mathematical objects are accessible to the Greeks. Not so for modern representation. More will be said on Descartes below. In addition, the letter sign indirectly, through rules, operational usages, and syntactical distinctions of an algebraic sort, also refers to things, for example, five units.

From now on, number is both independent of human cognition not a product of the imagination or mind i. The mode of existence of the letter sign in its operational context is symbolic. For Aristotle the object of the arithmetical art results from abstraction, but abstraction understood in a precisely defined manner. The subtracted thing has real existence outside of the mind. The mode of existence of what the letter sign refers to in modern mathematics is not abstract in this Aristotelian sense, but is symbolic; it is more general.

In the modern sense, both the symbol and what it refers to are not only unique, arising out of the new understanding of number implied by the algebraic art of Viete, they are, as well, logical correlates of one another, symmetrically and transitively implying each other i.

The philosopher Kant will ground this viewing in his Critique of Pure Reason. But at the same time, while bound to the ancient concept, the modern version is, paradoxically, less general. The scope of the denotation, or the extension, increases as abstractness increases, and, once again, the more general is also the less imaginable. But this is precisely what symbolic abstraction is not.

What are the things which are represented here? But this faculty of intellectual intuition is not understood in terms of the Kantian faculty of intellectual intuition. It is, for Kant, a faculty that is impossible and illustrates a limitation on human knowing. It requires, according to Descartes, the aid of the imagination. A shift in ontology, the passage from the determinateness of arithmos and its reference to the world, even if it is to the world of the Forms of Plato, to a symbolic mode of reference becomes absorbed by what appears to be a mere notational convenience, its means of representation, i.

Consider two results of this intellectual revolution. This not only allows, but logically implies, a metaphysically neutral understanding of mathematics. A mathematician in Moscow, Idaho, and one in Moscow, Russia, are dealing with the same objects although no reference to the world, generic or ontological, needs to be imputed.

This is possible because the imagination is Janus-like. Viete for one, as well as Fermat, simplified their achievements. But this blindness to its own achievements, from which the modern science of nature suffers, is a condition of its success.

Whether you are a seasoned user or even a beginner Bitcoin user, chances are you have visited or have heard of Bitcointalk. First, Bitcointalk often shortened to Btctalk or even shorter bct , is an online forum that allows global users to discuss everything and anything related to Bitcoin and Altcoins. The forum dates back to , when even Satoshi himself visited it and wrote some posts, and has seen a significant increase in traffic and users ever since then.

The forum acts as a way to keep track of the latest news related to cryptocurrencies and even hosts a marketplace to conduct trades, transactions, and promotions. Due to the level of traffic Btctalk boasts, many users have taken to advertising their crypto-related websites on the forum via signature campaigns.

An example of a signature can be seen at the bottom of the example post below. This often requires the user to have a certain rank on Btctalk. The image below show the various Btctalk user account ranks and their activity levels.

Account activity is increased via post count as well as the age of the account. The activity calculation takes the minimum of the 14 x time and your post count, where time is the number of two-week periods you have posted since registering. As your activity increases, you should see your account rank increase accordingly.

The motive behind increasing your account rank is to receive better signature campaign payment rates as well as greater credibility when completing transitions. Related to credibility, on Btctalk there is also a trust system that better captures how trustworthy a user is. This is similar to the feedback system on an online marketplace such as eBay. The gist is, when you complete a transaction with someone on the forum, you can leave and receive trust.

The more trust you receive from other trusted users, the higher your trust rating. The same goes for negative trust and bad ratings. Due to signature campaigns and the marketplace on Btctalk, there are many places on the forum that are riddled with poor post quality or potential scammers.

Despite the negatives, Btctalk is an excellent forum to read about the latest developments and opinions in the crypto-scene. There are many legitimate and excellent opportunities to be found on the forum. There are also giveaways and promotions from people trying to have others test their work or gain traffic to their sites. All in all, I recommend Bitcoin and altcoin users to register with Btctalk and read the forums for topics of interest.

Thursday, January 7, Write for us. News Bitcoin.

Browse by O*NET Data The Principle of Reason and Information

Jul 23,  · Understanding the different types of knowledge - and in particular the difference between explicit and tacit knowledge - is a key step in promoting knowledge sharing, choosing the right information or knowledge management system, and implementing KM initiatives. 1. “Accepting knowledge claims always involves an element of trust.” Discuss this claim with reference to two areas of knowledge. The first title provides us with a number of terms that we need to reflect on and clarify: “acceptance”, “knowledge claims”, “always”, “involves” and “an element of trust”. Forgot password? Don't have an account? Sign up to become a mystery shopper. Tags:Iq bitcoin price, Etc to btc exchange, How do i add bitcoins to my account, How small can bitcoin be divided, 0xbitcoin stats

2 thoughts on “Knowledge btctalk

  1. Akizuru

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  2. Mazuzil

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